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Abstract—Weather and environmental factors are verified to
have played significant roles in historical major cascading outages
and blackouts. Therefore, in the simulation and risk assessment of
cascading outages in power systems, it is necessary to consider
the weather and environmental effects. This paper proposes a
method for the risk assessment of weather-related cascading
outages. Based on the analysis of historical outage records and
temperature-dependent physical outage mechanisms of transmis-
sion lines, an outage rate model considering weather condition
and conductor temperature is proposed, and the analytical form
of outage probability of lines are derived. With the weather-
dependent outage model, a two-stage risk assessment method
based on Markovian tree (MT) search is proposed, which consists
of offline full assessment, and online efficient update of risk
assessment results and continued MT search using updated NWP
data. The test cases on NPCC 140-bus test system model in winter
and summer scenarios verify the advantages of the proposed risk
assessment method in both accuracy and efficiency.
Index Terms—cascading outage, weather, temperature, risk as-
sessment, Markovian tree, numerical weather prediction (NWP)
I. INTRODUCTION
WEATHER and environmental factors have ineligibleeffects on the reliability of power systems [1]. Since
power systems cover vast geographical areas and large num-
bers of components are directly exposed to the environment,
adverse weather conditions deteriorate the working conditions
of the components and may even directly cause components
to quit. Weather have been verified as a major cause and
contributing factor of outages of elements in power systems
[2]. Many historical cascading outages and blackouts were also
attributed to the adverse weather conditions, including hot and
low-wind weather [3], [4], thunder storm [5], ice and snow [6],
etc. Therefore, it is necessary to consider weather conditions
in the risk assessment of cascading outages.
The risk assessment of cascading outages considering
weather conditions in real applications has two requirements:
1) accurate forecast of weather conditions covering the studied
power system; 2) a weather-dependent model of cascading
outages. The first requirement is now generally satisfied by
the numerical weather prediction (NWP) service [7], whose
results can be retrieved from public resources. The weather-
dependent model for cascading outage simulation that can be
utilized along with the NWP has not been proposed. Ref. [8]
proposed a method for simulation of weather-related cascading
outages, but the method does not provide time elapse of
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cascading outages, which is hard to be utilized along the
weather data time series. Also it still uses Monte-Carlo method
to assess the risk, which is inefficient and difficult to use in
online applications. Weather conditions are more extensively
considered in the reliability assessment of power systems [9]–
[11]. However, these approaches are mainly for long-term
reliability assessment, not for the online analysis of dependent
cascading outages. Also, the typical weather models in these
approaches (e.g. the two-state/three-state model) are too coarse
to meet the requirement of operational risk assessment.
During the evolution process of cascading outages, the
weather type, quantitative weather condition, and the working
conditions influenced by the environment (e.g. the temperature
of transmission line conductors) have significant influence on
the outage rate of the elements. Therefore, a more accu-
rate weather-dependent element outage model is necessary.
Ref. [12] proposed an interval method for the estimation
of outage rates of transmission lines on the condition of
given weather scenarios, which meets the requirements for
the risk assessment of 1-hour resolution. Moreover, to meet
the requirement for the risk assessment of cascading outages,
the outage rate as a function of real-time states should also be
considered. The record of Aug. 14 2003 blackout [3] indicates
that the dynamic of conductor temperature variation should
be analyzed in timescale of a sub-hourly level. Our previous
work [13] has proposed an efficient method for the simulation
of transmission line temperature evolution (TLTE) based on
NWP data. Also, [1] proposed an efficient method for the risk
assessment of multi-timescale cascading outages [14] based
on Markovian tree (MT) search. The method provides time
elapse in cascading outage processes, so that it can be utilized
for the risk assessment of weather-related cascading outages
by using NWP data.
This paper proposes a method for the risk assessment of
weather-related cascading outages. The paper first proposes
a generic model of transmission line outage depending on
the weather condition and conductor temperature, and the
analytical expression of the outage probability is derived
from the generic outage model, which sets foundation for
the efficient risk assessment considering environmental factors.
Also from the major mechanisms of line outages, the detailed
method for determining the parameters in the outage model is
provided. With the weather-dependent outage model, a two-
stage method for cascading outage risk assessment based on
Markovian tree (MT) search is proposed. The method consists
of offline full assessment using the possibly less accurate
weather data, and online efficient update of risk assessment
result as well as continued MT search with latest weather data,
which enhances both accuracy and efficiency as compared to
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2the single-stage offline or online assessment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
proposes the generic model of transmission line outage rate,
and derives the analytical form of outage probability. Section
III elucidates the determination of the transmission line outage
rates based on weather data, historical data and conductor
specifications. Section IV introduces the two-stage weather-
dependent risk assessment of cascading outages. Section V is
the test case on the risk assessment of NPCC system model
in winter and summer scenarios. Section VI is the conclusion.
II. WEATHER-DEPENDENT TRANSMISSION LINE OUTAGE
MODEL
A. Outage rates of transmission lines
In order to model transmission line outages, we need
to analyze the in-depth mechanism of line outages. Some
causes of line outages have strong correlation with excessive
conductor temperature, e.g. tree contacts due to sagging and
line outage due to annealing [15]. While some other causes
do not have strong relationship with conductor temperature,
but highly depend on the weather conditions. Therefore line
outages should be described as stochastic processes whose
parameters are dependent on weather conditions and conductor
temperature. Assume the occurrence of line outage follows
Poisson process, then its parameter, the failure rate λ is a
function of conductor temperature Tc and weather condition e.
Because of the routine utility vegetation management (UVM)
along the transmission line and the factory temperature rating
of conductor materials, the transmission line below a certain
temperature Tsafe (e.g. 70◦C) is regarded as free from outages
caused by over-temperature of conductor. In this case the
outage rate is assumed as a function of weather condition e.
λ(Tc, e|Tc < Tsafe) = λs(e) (1)
The historical records of line outages can roughly dis-
tinguish the cause and the environmental condition at the
occurrence of an outage. Given a certain weather condition
e, the overall conditional outage rate of the studied line λ(e)
can be estimated. Further considering the factor of conductor
temperature Tc, λ(e) can be expressed as
λ(e) =
∫ +∞
−∞
λ(Tc, e)pT (Tc)dTc
=
∫ Tsafe
−∞
λ(Tc, e)pT (Tc)dTc +
∫ +∞
Tsafe
λ(Tc, e)pT (Tc)dTc
=
∫ Tsafe
−∞
λs(e)pT (Tc)dTc +
∫ +∞
Tsafe
λ(Tc, e)pT (Tc)dTc
(2)
where pT (·) is the probabilistic distribution function of Tc.
Since the transmission line outages caused by overheating and
excessive temperature only accounts for a very small portion
over all the outages [16], the second term in (2) is much
smaller than the first term, so approximately
λ(e) ≈
∫ Tsafe
−∞
λs(e)pT (Tc)dTc = λs(e)Pr(Tc < Tsafe)
(3)
Since the overall probability of transmission line tempera-
ture exceeding safe level is rare, Pr(Tc < Tsafe) ≈ 1, so
λs(e) ≈ λ(e) (4)
Below Tsafe the outage rate can be approximated as sta-
tistical failure rate λ(e), while above Tsafe additional risk of
outage emerges, e.g. tree contact due to sagging, and conductor
damage due to annealing, etc. So the outage rate above Tsafe
will be larger than λ(e) and depends on the temperature of
conductor Tc, so the outage rate λ can be regarded the sum
of λ(e) and additional outage rate λc(Tc, e) .
λ(Tc, e) = λ(e) + λc(Tc, e) (5)
λ 
Tc
 λ(e)
λc(Tc,e)
Fig. 1. Failure rate as a function of conductor temperature
B. Analytical weather-dependent line outage rate
Our previous work [13] proposes an approximate analyt-
ical solution to the transmission line temperature evolution
(TLTE). The method periodically retrieves the environmental
parameters such as ambient temperature, wind speed and
direction, etc., from numerical weather prediction (NWP),
and then derives the parameters of analytical solution from
the environmental parameters, conductor parameters and line
current. The approximate solution is in the following form
Tci(t) = Tei(pi(t0))+(Tci(t0)−Tei(pi(t0)))e−βi(pi(t0))(t−t0)
(6)
where Tci(t) is the temperature of line segment i at time t. pi
are all the factors that influence the TLTE, such as weather,
line current, conductor parameters, etc. The NWP result is
collected periodically. Currently the temporal resolution of
NWP covering the United States is 15 min, which can satisfy
the requirement of TLTE analysis [7]. Due to the thermal
volume of the line conductor, the TLTE is not sensitive to the
fast fluctuation of the parameters. So a set of constant values
pi(t0) is used to represent the average effect of the parameters
over the 15min period. Tei and βi are the parameters of the
analytical solution, which depend on pi. Within the 18 hours
time coverage of NWP, the TLTE of each line segment can be
expressed as joined segments of 15-min analytical solutions.
Assume that the unit-length failure rate of the line segment
λi(Tci) is a continuous function of conductor temperature in
a certain range of [Tci, Tci], and then it can be approximated
with a polynomial of Tci.
3λi(Tci) =
n∑
k=0
aikTci
k, Tci ∈ [Tci, Tci] (7)
After obtaining (7), substituting (6) into (7) gets
λit(t) = λi(Tci(t))
=
n∑
k=0
aik
(
Tei + (Tci(t0)− Tei)e−βi(t−t0)
)k
=
n∑
k=0
bike
−kβi(t−t0)
(8)
where the coefficient bik are
bik =
n∑
j=k
aij
j!
k!(j − k)!Tei
j−k(Tci(t0)− Tei)k (9)
The integral of failure rate over time is
∫ t
t0
λit(t)dt = bi0(t− t0) +
n∑
k=1
bik
kβi
−
n∑
k=1
bik
kβi
e−kβi(t−t0)
(10)
The overall failure rate of a transmission line Lj is the sum
of failure rates of all line segments belonging to Lj .
λLjt(t) =
∑
i∈Lj
li · λit(t) (11)
where li is the length of segment i. During the time interval
of [t0, t], the probability of line Lj failure is
PrLj (t) = 1− e−
∑
i∈Lj li·
∫ t
t0
λit(t)dt (12)
The Markovian tree model uses the probability of line Lj
first trip during the interval [t0, t0 + τD], which is
PrMTLj (t0 + τD) =
∫ t0+τD
t0
λLjt(t)e
−∑Lj ∫ tt0 λLjt(τ)dτdt
(13)
For general λLjt(t), (13) does not have an explicit analytical
form, but it can be approximately calculated by converting
integral into a numerical summation. If λLjt(t) is not time-
dependent, then (13) has analytical form
PrMTLj (t) =
λLjt∑
Lj
λLjt
(
1− e
∑
Lj
λLjt(t−t0)
)
(14)
Remark: the method does not require that the failure rate is
a continuous function of Tci. It is, rather assumed as a non-
decreasing function of Tci. Since the temperature evolution
(6) is monotonic, if there is discontinuity, then λi(Tci) can be
treated in segments.
III. DETERMINATION OF OUTAGE RATES
This section proposes a detailed method for determining the
outage rates of transmission lines. According to (5) in Section
II.A, the outage rate can be decomposed as the sum of average
weather-dependent outage rate λ(e) and additional outage rate
of high conductor temperature λc(Tc, e). We assume the threat
of line outage at high conductor temperature is excessive sag-
ging and damage caused by annealing, so λc(Tc, e) is regarded
as the sum of outage rates caused by sagging λSag(Tc, e) and
λAnneal(Tc, e). Then the overall outage rate is
λ(Tc, e) = λ(e) + λSag(Tc, e) + λAnneal(Tc, e) (15)
The following subsections elucidate the determination of
every component of outage rate.
A. Failure rate related to different weather phenomena
Weather conditions can significantly influence the reliability
of elements in power systems. Take transmission lines as an
example. Their operation can be affected by various adverse
weather conditions, as listed in Table. I.
TABLE I
HAZARDS OF WEATHER CONDITIONS TO TRANSMISSION LINES
Weather condition e Cause of outage
rain/fog/haze fog-/wet-flashover
thunderstorm lightning strike
high wind increased tension & tree contact
snow/freezing rain increased tension load
hot weather increased conductor temperature
[12] proposed a method for inferring the weather-related
outage rates λ(e) from historical records. Therefore, with
the forecast of weather conditions from numerical weather
prediction, the outage rates of transmission lines in the system
over a period can be estimated. In this paper, we use the
method in [12] to estimate λ(e) from historical records.
B. Failure rate due to sagging and tree contact
The sag s of line section can be approximated as a linear
function of conductor temperature Tc [17].
s(Tc) = s0 + sT · Tc (16)
The higher Tc, the larger s(Tc), and the higher is the chance
that trees or objects intrude into the discharging range of
conductors and cause line outage. Define the sag that just
causes line outage as critical sag sc, and assume the distri-
bution of critical sag (determined mainly by object heights) to
satisfy normal distribution, so the temperature corresponding
to sc (named critical sag temperature Tcs)also satisfies normal
distribution, as N(µT , σT 2). Assume the rate of failure due to
sagging λSag to be proportional to the probability of conductor
temperature Tc being higher than Tcs.
λSag(Tc) ∝ Pr{Tcs ≤ Tc} = FTcs(Tc) (17)
where FTcs(·) is the CDF of Tcs. Note that due to UVM
scheme, usually the vegetation will be trimmed so that under
normal operation temperature the line outage due to tree
contact is practically avoided. Assume that the post-UVM
distribution of Tsc satisfies Tsafe is at least 3σT away from
µT , which means that tree-contact under Tsafe is nearly im-
possible. But due to some extreme hot and low-wind weather,
the conductor temperature may drift above Tsafe, causing tree-
contact more possible [3], [17].
4C. Failure rate due to annealing and tensile loss
The tensile loss characteristics under elevated temperature
of various conductors are proposed in [18]–[20]. For example,
[18] proposed the formula on percentage of tensile loss of
aluminum conductors.
La = 100− T · t−0.00254max{Tc−95,0}/D (18)
where T = min{134−0.24Tc, 100} in ◦C, conductor diameter
D is in mm, and the duration t is in hour. Assume the outage
rate due to annealing is proportional to the loss of tensile
λAnneal(Tc) ∝ La (19)
(18) indicates that the tensile starts to decrease upon reach-
ing 95◦C, and loss of tensile significantly accelerates after
temperature becomes higher than around 140◦C, as shown in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Loss of tensile as function of conductor temperature
IV. TWO-STAGE RISK ASSESSMENT WITH MT SEARCH
Our previous work [1] proposed an efficient risk assessment
of cascading outages method based on Markovian tree search.
The method derives an expansion of cascading outage risk
corresponding to the tree structure. Here we assume that the
initial power flow pattern for cascading outage analysis does
not change substantially from the day-ahead unit-commitment
result to the real-time power flow, which is generally true in
most cases. In this case, when the environmental condition
changes or is updated, the terms of the outage probabilities in
the expansion can be re-calculated and thus the total risk is
efficiently updated. This scheme avoids the re-calculation of
entire risk assessment.
Therefore, a two-stage scheme of risk assessment based on
Markovian tree search is proposed. The offline stage is to
conduct complete risk assessment with the available weather
data, which has no big difference from the original version
proposed in [1]. Then the online stage refines the result of
risk assessment with updated weather data, updates the risk
estimation index on MT, and continues several attempts of
MT search to find new risk brought by the updated weather
data. The online stage includes the following two steps.
A. Update the risk terms on MT
According to [1], the risk assessment based on Markovian
tree search derives the expansion of cascading outage risk
corresponding to the tree structure:
R = C0 +
∑
k1
Pr(ik1)C(ik1)
+
∑
k1
Pr(ik1)
∑
k2
Pr(ik2 |ik1)C(ik1ik2)
+
∑
k1
Pr(ik1)
∑
k2
Pr(ik2 |ik1)
∑
k3
Pr(ik3 |ik1ik2)C(ik1ik2ik3)
+ · · ·
(20)
each level on the MT corresponds to a time interval τD,
and each node is labeled with the outage sequence from the
root, as (ik1 · · · ikn), where ikr is either a positive integer
denoting the index of the element failed on the rth level or
0 if no outage occurs on this level. The cost corresponding
to state (ik1 , · · · , ikn) is C(ik1 · · · ikn), and the conditional
probability of outage event ikr+1 after state (ik1 · · · , ikr ) is
Pr(ikr+1 |ik1 · · · ikr ).
The update of risk assessment result has two steps:
1) The update of transmission line temperature evolution
(TLTE), which is necessary for estimating the outage prob-
ability. The update of TLTE is sequential along a cascading
outage path. With the analytical solution of TLTE adaptable
to multiple system states proposed in [13], the TLTE can be
calculated efficiently.
2) With the weather data and TLTE, the probability terms
in the MT expansion of risk is updated according to Section
II.B. This step can be implemented efficiently in parallel.
B. Continue MT search
The continued MT search requires the update of not only
all the risk terms in (20), but also the risk estimation indices
(REI) that effectively guides the search to high-risk cascading
outage paths. So in this step, the REIs should be first updated,
and then MT search can be continued.
1) The REIs are updated recursively on the MT. The
complete procedure is demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Updating REIs (pseudo-codes).
Assume Pr0(·) and ρ0(·) are original outage probability and REI, and
updated outage probability and REI are denoted as Pr(·) and ρ(·).
function updateREI(ik1 · · · ikr )
if ik1 · · · ikr is the end of cascade path
ρik1 ···ikr = εR
elseif ik1 · · · ikr is not reached on MT
ρik1 ···ikr = ρ
0
ik1 ···ikr
·Pr(ikr |ik1 · · · ikr−1 )/Pr0(ikr |ik1 · · · ikr−1 )
else (i.e. ik1 · · · ikr has subordinate states)
foreach subordinate state ik1 · · · ikr ikr+1
updateREI(ik1 · · · ikr ikr+1 )
endforeach
update probability for MT search [1]:
Prcalcik1 ···ikr ikr+1
=
(ρik1
···ikr ikr+1
)µ∑
i′
kr+1
(ρik1
···ikr i
′
kr+1
)µ
(µ ≥ 0)
update REI: ρik1 ···ikr =
∑
i′
kr+1
ρik1 ···ikr i′kr+1
Prcalc
ik1 ···ikr i′kr+1
endif
end
2) Continue the risk assessment of MT search [1] using the
new weather data.
5V. TESTS ON NPCC 140-BUS SYSTEM
A. Weather-dependent parameters of outage rates
The base weather-dependent outage rate is determined using
the method proposed in [12]. Here the precipitation type is
categorized as four: rain, snow, freezing rain and ice pellets.
The weather condition evidence variables in this paper are
ambient temperature (E1), wind speed (E2), lightning (E3),
rain (E4), snow (E5), freezing rain (E6), ice pellets (E7). The
evidence and outcome are defined in Table II.
TABLE II
EVIDENCE AND OUTCOME VARIABLES
Variable State 1 State 2 State 3
E1
Ta < 4◦C 4◦C ≤ Ta < 26◦C Ta ≥ 26◦C
(e1,1) (e1,2) (e1,2)
E2
Vw < 12km/h 12km/h≤ Vw < 40km/h Vw ≥ 40km/h
(e2,1) (e2,2) (e2,2)
E3
Lightning No lightning –
(e3,1) (e3,2) –
E4
Rain No rain –
(e4,1) (e4,2) –
E5
Snow No snow –
(e5,1) (e5,2) –
E6
Freezing rain No freezing rain –
(e6,1) (e6,2) –
E7
Ice pellets No ice pellets –
(e7,1) (e7,2) –
Assume h1 stands for the normal state of a transmission
line, and h2 stands for outage. The outage rate parameters
are the same as in Sections V.A and V.B in [12] besides the
parameters for freezing rain and ice pellets, as shown in Table
III and IV.
TABLE III
CONDITIONAL MASS FUNCTION OF FREEZING RAIN
H E1 P (e6,1|H,E1) P (e6,2|H,E1)
h1 e1,1 0.14 0.86
h1 e1,2 0.03 0.97
h1 e1,3 0.00 1.00
h2 e1,1 [0.85, 0.95] [0.05, 0.15]
h2 e1,2 [0.00, 0.03] [0.97, 1.00]
h2 e1,3 [0.00, 0.01] [0.99, 1.00]
TABLE IV
CONDITIONAL MASS FUNCTION OF ICE PELLETS
H E1 P (e7,1|H,E1) P (e7,2|H,E1)
h1 e1,1 0.14 0.86
h1 e1,2 0.02 0.98
h1 e1,3 0.00 1.00
h2 e1,1 [0.80, 0.90] [0.10, 0.20]
h2 e1,2 [0.00, 0.02] [0.98, 1.00]
h2 e1,3 [0.00, 0.01] [0.99, 1.00]
Assume the number of evidence is nE , and the bounds of
the outage rate are:
λ = Pr(h2|e) = min
∏nE
j=1 Pr(ej,kj |h2, e) · Pr(h2)∑2
i=1
∏nE
j=1 Pr(ej,kj |hi, e) · Pr(hi)
λ = Pr(h2|e) = max
∏nE
j=1 Pr(ej,kj |h2, e) · Pr(h2)∑2
i=1
∏nE
j=1 Pr(ej,kj |hi, e) · Pr(hi)
(21)
where e = {ej,kj}, j = 1, 2, · · · , nE . In this case, we use the
median value as the estimation of outage rate, λ = (λ+λ)/2.
B. Winter scenario
In this section, we test the proposed method on the NPCC
140-bus system. Select the weather conditions at 12:00 EDT
(Eastern Daylight Time) on March 14th, 15th and 16th, 2017,
and implement risk assessments respectively. It should be
noted that during March 13th-15th, the winter storm ”Stella”
swept from southwest to northeast through the area of NPCC
system. The winter storm reached at maximum in the area
on March 14th, and then the storm diminished and nearly
completely moved out of NPCC area on 16th.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3. 1-hour precipitation forecast (mm) at 12:00 EDT on Mar. 14 (a), Mar.
15 (b), and Mar. 16 (c), 2017. Precipitation type by boundary color: magenta
– rain, yellow – snow, green – freezing rain, cyan – ice pellets.
Use the weather-dependent risk assessment to calculate risk
on these three days, the results are listed in Table V. The
initial system states on the three days are assumed to be the
same, and the only difference is in their weather conditions.
The result verifies that the weather has significant influence
on the cascading outage risk.
First take the cascading outage path with highest risk (path
A) on March 14. Table VI lists the outage rates of each level
6TABLE V
COMPARISON OF CASCADING OUTAGE RISK (WINTER SCENARIO)
March 14 March 15 March 16
Risk(MW) 2.48 0.54 0.11
of branch outage. The short-timescale outages are listed in the
parenthesis, and the data in bold is the highest outage rate
among the three days. It can be seen that the outage rates on
March 14 is significantly higher than those on March 15 and
16 for most levels of the cascading outages. Even though the
outage rates on some levels are not the highest on March 14,
the difference is not significant.
TABLE VI
OUTAGE RATES BY LEVELS IN CASCADING OUTAGE PATH A
Level Outages Outage rates (s
−1)
March 14 March 15 March 16
1 101(initial) – – –
2 47 (48, 52) 3.85× 10−8 1.60× 10−8 1.89× 10−9
3 185 2.78× 10−9 2.79× 10−9 3.15× 10−9
4 114 2.46× 10−9 2.36× 10−9 2.96× 10−9
5 178 5.47× 10−9 5.62× 10−9 6.89× 10−9
6 109 6.22× 10−7 9.25× 10−8 5.66× 10−9
7 15 3.49× 10−8 1.48× 10−9 1.55× 10−9
8 66 1.19× 10−7 7.99× 10−8 5.17× 10−9
9 111 1.83× 10−8 2.23× 10−8 1.45× 10−9
10 9 7.20× 10−8 3.49× 10−9 3.75× 10−9
Risk of path A(MW) 6.63× 10−1 2.76× 10−1 3.25× 10−2
Fig. 4. Cascading outage path A and weather overlay on March 14.
Fig. 4 shows the geographical positions of the lines that are
tripped (red) in the cascading outage path A, as well as the
weather condition of Mar. 14. The significantly higher outage
rates as shown in Table VI correspond to geographical regions
with the most severe snow storm.
However, not all the cascading outage paths on March 14
are higher than that on other two days. Take March 16 as
an example. Although the overall weather condition on this
day is the least risky for cascading outages, some cascading
outage paths have higher risk instead. On March 16th, the
snow storm has moved out of the NPCC area, but some
scattered precipitation still occurred around Lake Erie due
to ”the lake effect”. Correspondingly, the outage rate around
the precipitation falling area rises. Table VII lists a cascading
outage path (path B, as shown in Fig. 5) that occurs partly
around the Lake Erie.
Fig. 5. Cascading outage path B and weather overlay on March 16.
TABLE VII
OUTAGE RATES BY LEVELS IN CASCADING OUTAGE PATH B
Level Outages Outage rates (s
−1)
March 14 March 15 March 16
1 233(initial) – – –
2 161 5.00× 10−8 5.63× 10−8 7.39× 10−8
3 162 7.43× 10−8 3.77× 10−9 4.62× 10−9
4 122 1.39× 10−8 1.69× 10−9 7.38× 10−10
5 95 9.87× 10−8 9.89× 10−8 4.66× 10−9
6 58 2.03× 10−8 2.02× 10−8 8.43× 10−10
7 13 3.07× 10−8 1.79× 10−9 1.89× 10−9
8 8 5.63× 10−8 2.59× 10−9 2.83× 10−9
Risk of path B(MW) 9.03× 10−5 1.02× 10−4 1.34× 10−4
The results show that the outage rate of line 161 on March
16 is higher than that on March 14 and 15, which is caused
by the freezing rain fall along the line. Although rates of other
outages are lower on March 16, since the outage of line 161
contributes to most of the risk of the entire cascading outage
path, the risk on March 16 is still the highest.
C. Summer scenario
The hottest weather in NPCC area in 2016 occurred during
August 11-12. August 11th is a sunny, hot and low-wind
day, which may contribute to high conductor temperature of
transmission lines. We also choose Aug. 22th, which is sunny,
but much cooler and more windy day as comparison. The
ambient temperature and wind speed at noon on these two
days are demonstrated in Fig. 6.
As attributed to the hot and low-wind weather, the cascading
outage risk on Aug. 11 is significantly higher (see Table VIII).
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF CASCADING OUTAGE RISK (SUMMER SCENARIO)
August 11 August 22
Risk(MW) 18.23 4.65
On Aug. 11, some cascading outage paths with conductor
overheat events stand out with much higher risk than on Aug.
22. We take one typical cascading outage path (namely path
C) as an example, as shown in Fig. 7 and Table. IX. It can be
seen that for all outages, the outage rates on August 11 are
higher than those on August 22. Such a difference in outage
rates contributes to the over 10 times higher risk on Aug. 11
than on Aug. 22.
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Fig. 6. Ambient temperature and wind speed at 13:00 EDT, August 11 and
22, 2016. (a) and (b) are air temperature (◦C) on these two days, while (c)
and (d) show wind speed (m/s).
Fig. 7. Cascading outage path with weather overlay at 13:00 EDT on Aug.
11, 2016.
It should be noted from Table. IX that the overheat of
transmission line conductors have a significant effect towards
increasing the outage rate. Since the weather condition on
Aug. 11 and on Aug. 22 are not exactly the same, to achieve
fair comparison, we also compare the outage rates of same
line, at same time interval but with different temperatures,
as shown in Table. X. It can be seen that under the same
environmental conditions, the higher conductor temperature
brings a higher rate of line outage. This case verifies that the
TABLE IX
OUTAGE RATES BY LEVELS IN CASCADING OUTAGE PATH C (SUMMER)
Outage Aug. 11 Aug. 22Max Tc
(◦C)
Outage
rate (s−1)
Max Tc
(◦C)
Outage
rate (s−1)
100, 26, 39 (initial) – – – –
141 64.1 1.81× 10−6 42.7 3.46× 10−7
54 53.4 3.76× 10−7 38.1 5.47× 10−8
110 (9, 13, 36, 44,
45, 48, 49, 51, 56,
57, 60, 63, 94, 105,
111, 197, 199, 203)
72.4 8.62× 10−8 42.6 2.80× 10−8
88 (96, 128, 149,
151, 153, 161, 224)
104.4 9.86× 10−7 74.8 2.32× 10−8
183 102.5 3.30× 10−6 76.7 1.12× 10−7
190 (191, 192, 193,
216, 228)
92.3 5.79× 10−7 74.5 1.72× 10−7
150 83.4 1.64× 10−7 69.9 6.01× 10−8
65 82.9 5.25× 10−7 66.9 9.76× 10−8
Risk (MW) 1.76× 10−1 1.60× 10−2
line overheat caused by the power flow re-distribution is a
source of interdependency of cascading outages.
With the approximate analytical solution of TLTE as a
function of transmission line current in [13], the sensitivity
of outage probability to system states can also be estimated,
which could facilitate the derivation of strategies for reducing
cascading outage risk [21].
TABLE X
OUTAGE RATES AND TEMPERATURE ON AUGUST 11, 2016
Outage In path C In other pathsMax Tc
(◦C)
Outage rate
(s−1)
Max Tc
(◦C)
Outage rate
(s−1)
88 104.4 9.86× 10−7 52.8 8.97× 10−8
183 102.5 3.30× 10−6 47.1 3.29× 10−7
190 92.3 5.79× 10−7 45.0 1.29× 10−7
D. Two-stage risk assessment
We test the effectiveness and performance of the two-stage
risk assessment based on MT search. The NWP outreach
of HRRR (high-resolution rapid refresh) on Aug. 11 is 15
hours [22]. The forecast for 13:00-16:00 EDT Aug. 11 can
be acquired from the data of 01:00 EDT Aug. 11 (available
at around 02:00 EDT). We use the NWP data of 01:00 EDT
to conduct risk assessment for the time interval 13:00-16:00
EDT first, and then update the result in the second stage with
NWP data of 11:00 EDT (available at around 12:00 EDT).
TABLE XI
COMPUTATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS OF MT RISK ASSESSMENT
Config. Offline Online
Config. 1 – 12:00 MT search using11:00 EDT NWP data
Config. 2 1200 MT search using 01:00EDT NWP data
Update results with 11:00
EDT NWP data
Config. 3 800 MT search using 01:00EDT NWP data
Update offline results &
continued 400 MT search
with 11:00 EDT NWP data
TABLE XII
RISK AND COMPUTATION TIME UNDER DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration Risk (MW) Computation time (s)Offline Online
Config. 1 18.23 – 2226.04
Config. 2 17.69 2257.94 763.94
Config. 3 18.22 1752.49 1075.30
We compare 3 configurations of risk assessment listed in
Table. XI. The config. 1 completely relies on the online com-
putation. Config. 2 conducts full risk assessment in the offline
stage and only updates results using the latest NWP data.
Config. 3 is the proposed two-stage method, which assigns
most risk assessment offline and update the result online with
latest weather data, and then the risk assessment is continued
to search for emerging risk brought by the updated weather
condition. Table. XII shows the results of risk assessment and
8the computational time under each configuration. Compared
with Config. 1, the Config. 2 reduces online computation time
by about 70%, but risk is underestimated by about 3%. The
underestimation of risk is caused by the MT search using old
weather data, which does not fully reflect the risk in the actual
weather conditions. Such shortcoming is overcome by the two-
stage method. In Config. 3, the final risk assessment result
is almost the same as Config. 1, and the online computation
time is reduced by more than 50%. From the convergence
profiles of the 3 configurations of MT search shown in Fig.
8, the Config.2 and Config. 3 are the same in the first 800
MT search attempts, while after 800 MT search attempts, the
Config. 2 finds almost no new risk, while Config. 3 manages
to search out about 3% risk in the online stage with updated
weather data. This case verifies the advantage of two-stage
risk assessment in both accuracy and efficiency for online
assessment.
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Fig. 8. MT risk assessment results under different configurations
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a method for the risk assessment of
weather-related cascading outages in power systems. First
according to the outage mechanisms, a generic outage rate
model of transmission lines dependent on weather condition
and conductor temperature is proposed, and then based on the
polynomial approximation of outage rate and the analytical
solution of transmission line temperature evolution (TLTE),
the analytical expression of outage probability of transmission
line is derived, which facilitates efficient risk assessment of
weather-related cascading outages. Based on the modeling
of physical outage mechanisms, i.e. weather-induced outages,
outages caused by sagging into vegetation and by damage
of overheat, the outage rates of transmission lines can be
estimated with given weather conditions, historical outage
records and conductor parameters. With the weather-dependent
outage model, a two-stage risk assessment method based on
Markovian tree (MT) search is proposed. The method consists
of offline full assessment with early weather prediction data
and efficient online update of risk assessment and continued
supplementary risk assessment with imminent weather predic-
tion data, which has advantage both in accuracy and efficiency.
The method is tested on an NPCC 140-bus test system
model with geographical positions. The tests on winter and
summer scenarios verify that the proposed method can reflect
the threat of adverse weather conditions on the power sys-
tems. Also the advantage of the two-stage risk assessment in
accuracy and efficiency is demonstrated.
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